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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
tirely controlled by statute and that no statute in this state authorized it. In
so deciding, the court considered Sections 12056, 12060, 12067, and 12069
of the General Code.
EDGAX I. KG
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Divorce and Alimony
In Cousmno v. Coustno' the trial court found that the parties "were liv-
ing in the same home at the time the cause came on to be heard" and dis-
missed the divorce action. On appeal it was held that while cohabitation
will be inferred from the living together of the parties, and condonation
will be inferred from the living together of the parties, and condonation of
aggression will be inferred from cohabitation if the contrary does not ap-
pear, where the evidence discloses that the parties had no sexual relations
during the pendency of the action dismissal upon the ground that the parties
were living in the same house, and that the aggression was thereby con-
doned, was error.
It was held in Dexter v. Taylor2 that in an action for divorce and alimony
brought against a non-resident defendant, or one whose residence is un-
known, the trial court could subject real estate located within its territorial
jurisdiction to the claim for alimony upon service by publication even
though the realty was neither described nor specifically mentioned either in
the petition or in the publication.
In Tustce v. Justtce3 the court decreed that in an action for alimony only
wherein a separation decree and alimony was awarded to the wife a recon-
ciliation and resumption of cohabitation for four months, followed by an-
other separation, did not affect the separation decree; and that such decree
could be nullified only by a court upon reasonable application of both
parties for a consent order or upon application of one party and a finding
by the court that the reconciliation or continued cohabitation was such a
change of circumstances that would warrant voiding the decree.
The decision rests upon sound reasoning for, as pointed out by the
court, a contrary rule would either discourage reconciliation or encourage
a scheming party to attempt a reconciliation solely to escape the decree of
the court.
190 Ohio App. 449, 107 N.E.2d 213 (1952)
'107 N.E.2d 402 (Ohio App.), appeal dism ssed, 156 Ohio St. 182, 101 N.Y.2d
502 (1951)
'108 N.E.2d 874 (Erie Com. PL 1952).
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A case of great interest is Seitz v. Seitz.4 The court held that a decree
in a divorce action fixing the amount the husband was to pay for the support
of minor children could be consequently modified so as to lessen the amount
to be paid for the minors' support even though the court had approved the
parents' contract of separation and made it a part of their judgment entry
since the court retained jurisdiction by stating in the judgment entry that
the amount agreed upon was to be paid" until further order of this
court."
An interesting case involving the custody of a minor child is Lockard v.
Lockard.5 After a divorce by the mother of the minor from the child's
natural father, Stubbe, custody of the child was granted to the mother. She
subsequently married Lockard, who adopted the child. Later, Lockard was
granted a divorce from her and awarded sole custody of the child. The
natural father of the child, Stubbe, filed a motion to intervene and modify
the custody order. Upon hearing the adoptive father proved that he and the
mother were remarried the day before the hearing. The court denied the
motion, reasoning that the remarriage terminated the court's jurisdiction
over both parties and the minor child.
In Short v. Short8 in an action for annulment on the ground of a prior
existing marriage by one of the parties, the court held that while annulment
was a proper remedy the common pleas court erred in granting alimony.
When a marriage is declared void ab intuo neither party has a right to ali-
mony since alimony attaches only to a valid marriage.
Insofar as the decision recognizes that an annulment may be granted on
the ground of a prior existing marriage of one of the parties the decision has
been overruled by Eggleston v. Eggleston.'
The Eggleston case is one of the most important domestic relations cases
of the year. The supreme court held that where a marriage is entered into
and either party has a spouse living at the time, divorce is the exclusive
remedy and an annulment cannot be granted since the Ohio General Code
authorizes the granting of a divorce in such a situation.8 The court, fol-
lowing Vanvalley v. Vanvalley9 and quoting the dictum in Smth v. Smith, °
also held that the trial court is authorized to grant alimony to the petitioner.
It is to be noted that impotency and fraudulent contract, like a prior existing
marriage, although considered grounds for annulment under the common
'156 Ohio St. 516, 103 N.E.2d 741 (1952).
102 N.E.2d 747 (Geauga Coin. PL 1951).
6105 N.E.2d 276 (Ohuo App. 1950).
'156 Ohio St. 422, 103 N.B.2d 395 (1952).
'Oo GEN. CODE § 11979.
'19 Ohio St. 588 (1869).
5 Ohio St. 32 (1855).
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law, are grounds for divorce in Ohio and hence may be governed by the
exclusive remedy rule of the Eggleston case.
Husband and Wife: Torts
The problem of whether the wife of a deceased member of a voluntary
unincorporated association may maintain an action m tort against the
association for a tort committed against her during her husband's lifetime
was presented in Damm v. Elyra Lodge."1 The supreme court, in a unani-
mous decision, held: "In Ohio, the Constitution and the pertinent statutes
have the effect of so modifying the common-law rule as to authorize the
maintenance of the action by the plaintiff against her husband and conse-
quently against the defendants."'12 While the majority of courts have taken
a contrary position, there seems, to use the words of Dean Prosser," no
justification for the majority rule except that of historical survival."' 3
Parent and Child
The question of whether an unemancipated minor may bring a personal
tort action against a partnership of which his father is a member was an-
swered affirmatively by the supreme court in Signs v. Signs." The court,
although recognizing the overwhelinmg authority to the contrary, stated:
1 if there was ever a justification for the rule announced in Mississippi
in 1891,1 the justification has now disappeared, and . an unemancipated
child should have as dear a right to maintain an action in tort against his
parent in the latter's business or vocational capacity"6 as such child would
have to maintain an action in relation to his property rights." The opinion
is well-written and the position taken seems sound.
The question of whether natural parents of an infant, making a so-called
"permanent surrender" to a Family Service Society and Children's Bureau
have a right to revoke the "permanent surrender" at any time prior to the
actual award of adoption to persons to whom the custody of the child had
been surrendered by the society was answered in the affirmative in In re
Adopuon of Kane.7
"158 Ohio St. 107, 107 N.E.2d 337 (1952).
"Id. at 121, 107 NE.2d at 344.
"PRossER, ToRTs 904 (1941).
' 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952).
"Hewlett v. George, 168 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
The writer does not believe that the inclusion of the phrase "business or other
vocational capacity" is a limitation on the infant's right to bring sit against his
parent, but that the court completely departed from the majority rule. This am-
pression is based upon a reading of the opimon in the Signs case and the court's
reference to the Signs case m Danm v. Elyria Lodge, 158 Ohio St. 107, 117, 107
NE.2d 337, 343 (1952).
"91 Ohio App. 327, 108 N.E.2d 176 (1952).
"102 N.Y.2d 719 (Ohio App. 1951).
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